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THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM. Report of
the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. New
York: Dodd, Mead & Company. Pp. xxvi, 301. $5.00.
Because of the importance of the subject matter and the controversy
aroused by the publication of the Special Committee's report, two distinguished members of the bar have been invited to evaluate the report from
their respective points of view.
I

The Special Committee of the New York City Bar Association has not
only provided the nation with a valuable blueprint for improving the various
employee security programs, but it has also taken a much-needed step
toward restoring faith in the legal profession as defender of civil liberties.
For too long most lawyers and their associations have stood aside and
allowed a very few to carry the burden of defending both the principles
embedded in the Bill of Rights and the individuals accused of Communist
activities and associations. The New York City Bar Association, with the
assistance of a grant from the Fund for the Republic, has once again raised
the banner of the legal profession in defense of individual rights.
Had this been all, the Committee's report on the Federal LoyaltySecurity Program would have been a significant contribution to "cold war"
America. But this is not all. The report carefully weighs both the requirements of national security and the demands of individual freedom and
dignity and sets forth conclusions and recommendations well balanced for
the protection of both.
In a word, the conclusion of the Committee is that the Federal LoyaltySecurity Program I should be restricted to sensitive positions and should
be substantially revised to afford better protection to the individual in the
restricted area of sensitive positions. This conclusion of the distinguished
lawyers of the New York City Bar Association Committee is none the less
significant because it has long been the view of most liberal organizations.
At least in the field of civil liberties it is often more important who says
something than what he says. The fact that so distinguished a group of
lawyers-yes, corporation lawyers-has reached this conclusion may well
1. The Committee uses the term Federal Loyalty-Security Program to include
the Personnel Security Program for Federal Employees, the Atomic Energy Commission Program, the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program, the Port
Security Program and the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Program.

(771)

772

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105

bring about reforms that those who advocated the same conclusion earlier
could never have hoped to accomplish by themselves.
Indeed, the effect of the Committee's proposal to limit the Federal
Loyalty-Security Program to sensitive positions 2 is already apparent.
After the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Cole v. Youngs holding
that existing federal legislation did not authorize the security screening of
employees in non-sensitive positions, there was an immediate demand for
new legislation to provide for the screening of all federal employees. Not
only has no such legislation been enacted, but both political parties are now
on record for limiting the federal employees security program to sensitive
positions. The Democratic candidate for President in the recent campaign
expressly endorsed the changes proposed by the New York City Bar
Association Committee in an address at Walnut Hill, Virginia in September, and Assistant Attorney General George Cochran Doub told the
American Bar Association Criminal Law Section at Dallas in August that
the Administration was preparing a new executive order limiting the federal employees security program to sensitive positions.
The Committee appears to have considered the possibility that no
security program, even for sensitive positions, was required. The Committee pointed out that it had been unable to ascertain that any case of
espionage had been encountered by the program (p. 122) and seemed
to have doubts that the Soviet Union would any longer utilize as espionage
agents persons who could quite easily be detected from their present
or previous Communist memberships or associations (pp. 36, 153).
Nevertheless, the Committee seems quite rightly to have concluded that
some program for screening those persons who have access to secret and
top-secret information may act as an obstruction to Soviet espionage and,
recognizing the importance of national security in this period of the cold
war, doubts must be resolved in favor of a limited screening program.
Many of the Committee's suggestions for improving the various security programs for sensitive positions are in the direction long advocated by
practitioners and students in this field.
The Committee suggests a new standard for determining who is a
security risk (p. 149), one providing simply that the question "shall be
whether or not in the interest of the United States the employment or
retention in employment of the individual is advisable" with "due weight
to all the evidence, both derogatory and favorable, to the nature of the
position, and to the value of the individual to the public service." This
2. The Committee defines "sensitive positions" as those whose occupants would
have access to secret or top-secret security information and those whose occupants
have a policy-making function related to national security. The Committee's reconimendation would result in the abolition of the Port Security Program and the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Program and the drastic limitation of the
federal employees security program and the Defense Department's industrial security
program. The Committee estimates that under its recommendation the number of
persons covered by various loyalty and security programs would be reduced from about
6,000,000 to less than 1,500,000. (p. 146).
3. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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common-sense standard would certainly be more appropriate than the
present standard-that the employee's retention must be "clearly consistent" with the interests of the national security-which appears to put
the burden of proof on the accused.
The Committee proposes a central screening board (p. 159) which
would cut off inadequate or unwarranted charges before the hearing stage,
thus saving many an employee the cost and worry of a hearing. One might
raise the question whether it would not be well also to authorize such
a screening board to decide whether there was even sufficient information
against the employee to warrant a full field investigation which brings
FBI and other agents to the neighborhood of the suspect, to his embarrassment and discomfiture.
The Committee proposes the protection of employees against whom
formal charges have been lodged (p. 166) by continuing their pay during
suspension and by transferring them whenever possible to non-sensitive
positions pending hearing rather than suspending them. One might suggest
here that consideration be given to allowing a charged employee a permanent
transfer to a non-sensitive position if this is his preference.
The Committee proposes certain rights for applicants (p. 185) not now
accorded them except by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Committee suggests that an applicant should, upon his request, be furnished
with a statement of all adverse security information concerning him, with
the right to file an affidavit denying or explaining this information. This
would certainly seem a step in the right direction, but one would hope that
applicants would ultimately receive the same procedural protections as those
already employed. The Government is too large an employer and too
badly needs qualified personnel to permit the barring of an employee on
false allegations.
In two of its suggestions--concerning the Attorney General's list and
the issue of confrontation-the Committee appears to have been divided
and forced to come up with compromises. The Committee suggests either
the radical modification or abolition of the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. (p. 154). One receives the distinct impression
that at least some members of the Committee favored the latter step of
abolishing the list, with the Department of Justice instructed to furnish to
the executive departments on request information in its possession on
organizations whose nature was relevant to a particular security inquiry.
Probably the least satisfactory recommendation of the Committee is
that related to the accused's right of confrontation by his accusers. (p. 174).
The Committee suggests that the identity of regularly engaged undercover
agents need not be disclosed even to the hearing board if the head of the
investigating agency certifies that the identification of such an informant
would be detrimental to the interests of national security. The identities
of other informants are to be made known to the hearing board, whidh
would then decide whether they should be called for cross-examination
either by the hearing board in the absence of the accused or for actual
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confrontation by the accused. One wonders why the second procedure
should not be utilized for the first class of cases and why the witnesses in
the second class of cases should not regularly be made available for crossexamination. One cannot believe that a hearing board could not be trusted
with the examination of even an undercover agent. The existence of
undercover agents and their various tricks of the trade were publicly
disclosed in the Smith Act prosecutions and there would hardly seem to
be adequate reason for refusing to allow the hearing board to examine
such agents to find out whether an employee should be forever branded a
security risk on their say-so. To ensure that such examinations of undercover agents would not be widely diffused among different boards, this
authority might be given to a single board of distinguished personnel.
These and other recommendations of the Committee-centralization
of the program, carefully trained security personnel, composition of hearing boards, furnishing of written findings of facts and conclusions to the
charged employee, compensation of attorneys for employees-all evidence
the high degree of concern which the Committee felt for the rights of
the employee. This deep concern for the traditional rights of American
citizens, coming at a time when they have been temporarily forgotten, may
well have more lasting significance than the specific proposals made by
the Committee. For the leadership of the bar will be sorely needed if we
are to rebuild the framework of our individual rights in the wake of the
flood of hate and fear through which we have so recently passed.
Joseph L. Rauh, Jrt

ii
This report constitutes a careful and exhaustive presentation of the
federal security program, together with a number of recommendations
for its improvement. Mr. Dudley B. Bonsal, of the New York law firm of
Curtis Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, was chairman of the Committee.
The Committee included such distinguished members of the bar as Henry
J. Friendly, Harold M. Kennedy and Whitney North Seymour, of New
York, and Monte M. Lemarn of New Orleans. The eminent Professor
Elliott E. Cheatham of Columbia Law School headed the staff. A grant
from the Fund for the Republic provided the money for the project.
The staff conferred with over 150 people who have had experience
with the program or expressed views about it, including government
officials, lawyers who had represented government employees in security
cases, experts in political science and constitutional law, and journalists.
They are referred to in the report as "conferees." The report was apt Member, District of Columbia Bar.
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parently unanimous, although we can be sure that the "conferees" were not.
Apart from praise for the energy and effort which have so obviously gone
into the report and for its clarity and simplicity, comment must largely
be an expression of the writer's own views of the program itself and of
the recommendations of the Committee.
The principal recommendation of the Special Committee is a more
elaborate procedure, so as to make a dismissal proceeding approximate a

judicial trial.
My chief disagreement with both the loyalty-security program
and the Special Committee relate to a common feature: the guilt concept.
In my opinion the sole test of continued employment should be "suitability."
No factor other than suitability was relevant until Executive Order 9835
introduced the concept of "loyalty." Obviously a disloyal employee is not a
suitable employee; on the other hand an unsuitable employee is not necessarily a disloyal employee. But a finding of disloyalty involves a stigma,
while a finding of unsuitability does not. My own solution would therefore be to remove the stigma and to return to pre-existing procedures.
These were, the record indicates, fair and satisfactory to both Government
and employee. My point is best understood in the light of the history of
federal employee-removal policies and procedures.
The Constitution is silent on the subject of removal from federal employment. During the first forty years of government under the Constitution, removal procedures were entirely at the discretion of the appointing officer and, apart from a flurry during the Jefferson administration,
attracted little attention. The subject came to the fore in the administration
of President Jackson, the most ruthless of our presidents with respect
to employee removals. Shortly after his inauguration, Jackson, adopting
what has been called the "proscriptive policy" or "spoils policy," dismissed
from one-sixth to one-fourth of all federal civil employees. Applied on the
same scale today such a policy would involve dismissal of from 400,000
to 600,000 employees.
Although President Jackson has often been severely criticized for this
policy, its constitutionality has never been challenged. Thus, the late
Professor Alexander Johnston, conceding that President Jackson gave
"at least an appearance of Caesarism," continued, "but it was a strictly
constitutional Caesarism. The restraints of the written law were never
violated."
And the policy has its defenders. In his work, The Age of Jackson,
Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a leading spirit in the ADA, an
organization frequently critical of the federal security program, justifies
President Jackson's policy because, he says, it "contributed to the main
objective of helping to restore faith in the government."
Although never subsequently used to such an extreme, the "proscriptive policy" remained a feature of government administration for many
years. The Civil Service Act of 1883 to some extent regulated the
engagement of federal employees, but not their dismissal. The first removal
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protection for federal employees was afforded by an executive order issued
by President McKinley on July 27, 1897. This order forbade removal
"except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." The
removing officer was required to state his reasons in writing. The removing officer was further required to furnish the employee with a copy
of the charges against him and to allow him a reasonable time for answering them in writing. The order was silent as to witnesses and hearings
but the Civil Service Commission construed the order not to require them.
President McKinley's order received general public approval. The New
York Tribune, for instance, was ecstatic, and the New York Times stated

that President McKinley had "done the country a service and himself
honor."
In 1912, at the behest of Senator LaFollette, Congress wrote the
substance of President McKinley's order into statute law, the so-called
"Lloyd-LaFollette Act." At the time Senator LaFollette had protested
the Taft Administration's treatment of federal employees. Purporting
to act as their champion, Senator LaFollette introduced his bill. The bill
and the resulting statute made explicit the Civil Service Commission's
construction of President McKinley's order by providing expressly: "No
examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required, except
in the discretion of the officer making the removal." The bill passed both
Houses of Congress without a dissenting vote and was approved by
President Taft August 24, 1912. It is still the law in non-security cases.
In 1948 the Lloyd-LaFollette Act was re-enacted, with amendments not
material for purposes of this discussion, and approved by President Truman. The act, in its re-enacted form is now title 5, section 652, of the
United States Code. The implementing civil service regulation is 5 C.F.R.
§ 9, especially § 9.102.
That Senator LaFollette proposed this measure at a time when he was
aggressively crusading on behalf of federal employees against alleged unkindnesses by the current Administration would suggest that the procedure
provided by President McKinley's order had worked satisfactorily from
1897 to 1912; and apparently it has worked satisfactorily ever since. I
know of no agitation for its amendment or repeal.
In the light of what followed, the key words in the Executive Order
of July 27, 1897 and of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act can be seen to be
"promote the efficiency of the service." In other words, all that was required when an employee was removed was that his removal would "promote the efficiency of the service." It would promote the efficiency of the
service to remove a traitor. It would also promote the efficiency of the
service to remove an employee who wore such loud shirts that his fellow
workers were distracted. Indeed, it would promote the efficiency of the
service to remove an employee whose services were no longer needed for
any reason. The Special Committee refers to the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
procedure as relating to the "suitability" of the employee; that is, all that
a dismissal decides under ordinary civil service procedures is that the em-
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ployee is not "suitable" for further employment, and that word seems
as good any other.
In the early post-war era it became apparent that the Soviet Union had
developed the fifth column technique to a high degree and was engaged in
a serious effort to infiltrate the government as well as the organizational life
of the country generally; further, that the Soviet Union found its recruits
for this infiltration in the Communist Party and in Communist fronts.
In this situation President Truman, on March 21, 1947, issued Executive Order 9835, the original loyalty order. This order provided for the
systematic investigation of the "loyalty" of all federal employees. The
standard for removal was that "reasonable grounds exist for belief that the
person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." On
April 28, 1951 President Truman, by Executive Order 10241, revised the
standard so as to authorize removal whenever there appeared "a reasonable
doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the
United States."
The respective agency heads were charged with the immediate administration of the program. The order, further, created a Loyalty Review
Board in the Civil Service Commission. Employees were authorized
to appeal from adverse rulings by the department heads to this Board.
Also, the Board was given a certain supervision over the administration of
their respective programs by the agency heads.
The Act of August 26, 1950 authorized the heads of specified agencies
deemed especially sensitive (viz., the Departments of State, Commerce,
Justice, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission) to dismiss employees
who were "security risks." The purpose of this act was explained by its
principal sponsor, the Department of Defense: Many employees not subject
to removal because loyal and efficient, or at least not demonstrably disloyal or inefficient, were nevertheless not reliable from a security point of
view because of evil habits, such as alcoholism and homosexuality.
President Eisenhower changed both the standard and the method of
administration by Executive Order 10450, issued April 27, 1953. Under
the terms of that order the employee was to be dismissed unless his "retention" was "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security."
The Loyalty Review Board was abolished and full administration of the
program left with the agency head with a single exception: the agency
board to advise the agency head was to be recruited exclusively from other
agencies.
This history of the federal employee removal procedures has been condensed to emphasize what I believe to be the salient feature of the loyaltysecurity program and the report of the Special Committee.
Federal employees, the public generally and such organizations as
the American Civil Liberties Union have apparently always acquiesced
in the sketchy procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 652. Writers whose devotion to
liberty is unquestioned found no procedural vice in dismissals not based
upon confrontation of witnesses and other features of judicial trials, although they might disagree with such dismissals as a matter of policy.
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The Special Committee obviously believe that the employee will be
better protected by the more judicial type procedures they recommend.
I am most fearful that the result will be quasi-judicial findings of guilt
after hearings at which the cards were stacked against the employee.
Whatever the rules provide, officials simply are not going to keep an
employee in whom they have lost confidence. If the only way to get rid
of him is to find him guilty of something, they are likely to do so. But
such a finding of guilt will be taken more seriously by the world at large
than a dismissal for "unsuitability."
Another difficulty with the elaborate procedures recommended by the
Special Committee is the delay that they will necessarily cause. In my
opinion far more suffering was caused in loyalty cases by delay than by
any other factor. In the particular cases that I happen to know of, the
dismissed employees promptly got new jobs and were soon earning more
than their government salaries-a great deal more in at least one instance;
but they had been wretched while their cases were under consideration.
In support of the recommendations of the Special Committee it may
be urged that so long as the Government makes guilt rather than suitability
the test of employment, more elaborate procedures are necessary. This
argument is not without force, but the Committee was making recommendations for improvement of the program. For the reasons stated, I believe
that reversion to suitability as the test of employment would be the outstanding improvement.
The Special Committee recommends that the final decision be left to
the agency head. With this recommendation I am entirely in accord.
Under our system of organization of the executive branch it is the agency
heads who have the responsibility of getting things done. Looking at
employment as a means of accomplishing the employer's objectives, the
test should be the confidence of the agency head-realizing that agency
heads, being human, vary markedly in their judgments of men. It seems
to me that in this recommendation the Special Committee recognizes that
dismissal should rest on unsuitability and not on guilt.
The Special Committee further recommends the creation of an "Office
of Director of Personnel and Information Security" for purposes of coordination-more or less corresponding to the old Loyalty Review Board.
So long as the agency heads have principal authority, this coordination can
be helpful. But uniformity can be carried too far, assuming again that
the test is to be suitability and not guilt.
Another recommendation with which I heartily agree is training for
security personnel. One difficulty with the loyalty-security program in its
early days was that these personnel had little background on Communist
activities and had difficulty in distinguishing Communists from Socialists
and liberals. By the end of the Truman Administration they had been
pretty well educated. The Eisenhower Administration transferred many
of them to other work and got in a new and unsophisticated set who had
to learn all over again.
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The Special Committee touches on a point which to my mind is most
important. Is the program well adapted to the present modus operandi
of Soviet espionage? From 1923 to, say, 1946 the Soviet Union was
recruiting domestic agent§ through the Communist party and Communist
fronts. Hence in 1947 and succeeding years it was worthwhile to look into
the membership of federal employees in these organizations. But Communism no longer attracts our youthful intellectuals. I wonder whether
the effort expended in searching out the associations of those joining the
federal service today is justified. And is it not possible that there is less
energy left for the detection of such techniques as Soviet espionage is now
using?
C. Dickerman Williams t
t Member, New York Bar.
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